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PRIVATE ORDER UNDER DYSFUNCTIONAL
PUBLIC ORDER
John McMillan*
Christopher Woodruff**
The freedom and extent of human commerce depend entirely on a
fidelity with regard to promises.1

INTRODUCTION
Businesspeople need contractual assurance. Most transactions are
less straightforward than a cash sale of an easily identifiable item.
Buyers need assurance of the quality of what they are purchasing, and
sellers need assurance that bills will be paid. The legal system may not
always be available to provide contractual assurance - and when the
law is dysfunctional, private order might arise in its place.
Many developing and transition economies have dysfunctional le
gal systems, either because the laws do not exist or because the ma
chinery for enforcing them is inadequate. In such countries, bilateral
relationships, communal norms, trade associations, or market inter
mediaries may work in place of the legal system.2 In this Article, we
use data obtained from surveys of firms in five transition economies in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as Vietnam to
show that, at least in these economies, social networks and informal
gossip substitute for the formal legal system, while business networks

* Professor of International Management and Economics, Stanford Graduate School of
Business; B.Sc. 1971, M.Com. 1973, University of Canterbury (New Zealand); Ph.D. 1978,
University of New South Wales (Australia). Professor McMillan can be contacted at
mcmillanjohn@gsb.stanford.edu. - Ed. We thank the participants in the conference on
"Empirical Research in Commercial Transactions" at the University of Michigan Law
School for valuable comments, Jeffrey Bal<:er for research assistance, and the Stanford
Graduate School of Business for research support.
** Assistant Professor of Economics, Graduate School of International Relations and
Pacific Studies, University of California at San Diego. B.A. 1980, University of Chicago;
MA. {Economics) 1984, University of California at Los Angeles; Ph.D. {Economics) 1994,
University of Texas. Professor Woodruff can be contacted at cwoodruff@ucsd.edu. -Ed.
1. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 546 (Oxford University Press, 1978
& 1739).
2. Even in countries where the legal system works well, there is still often a need for pri
vate order, as we discuss later. For example, market players may prefer private-order
mechanisms to the courts, either because certain kinds of agreement are not susceptible to
court enforcement or because the transaction costs of using private order are smaller than
those of using the courts.
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and trade associations work in conjunction with it.3 These transition
countries provide an informative place to examine the interaction be
tween the formal legal system and private-order mechanisms because
both are in a state of flux. Although market-oriented laws have begun
to replace the bureaucratic controls of the old planned economy, pri
vate firms' access to the courts varies, from almost no access in
Vietnam to considerable access in Poland and Romania. Even within
these countries, the transitional state of the legal system means that
managers vary in their perceptions of the courts' usefulness, and ulti
mately it is their willingness or unwillingness to utilize the formal legal
system that shapes the development of private order.4 �ecause the
data from these economies contain more variation than would be
found in a steady-state economy, we can run meaningful regressions
relating firms' behavior to their perceptions of the courts' workability.
Many types of private-order mechanisms arise in market econo
mies. Sometimes parties directly involved in the transaction arrange
the private order. For example, if a buyer is locked in with a particu
lar seller, either because the seller is a monopolist or because the
buyer would face high costs of locating an alternative seller, the seller
can make the contract self-enforcing by cutting off further dealings.
Self-enforcement in these lock-in situations sometimes takes more
imaginative forms. A New York cable television company, Paragon
Cable, has a novel strategy to get its customers to pay their overdue
bills.5 It does not unhook the cable. Instead, using what is supposedly
a far more effective bill-collection measure, Paragon runs C-SPAN,
with its political speeches, debates, and hearings, on all seventy-seven
channels.
In close-knit communities, where people interact \vith each other
frequently and information flows freely, people may adhere to social
norms of cooperation because it is in their long-term interest to do so.
For example, this type of relational contracting has arisen spontane
ously within groups such as whalers and neighboring cattle farmers, as
Robert Ellickson has shown.6 In Asia, especially among the ethnic
Chinese, contracting typically rests on personal relationships, or

3. The surveys in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were done in collabora
tion with Simon Johnson. They are described in more detail in Simon Johnson et al., Entre
preneurs and the Ordering ofInstitutional Refonn: Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and
Ukraine Compared, 8:1 ECON. TRANsmoN 1 {2000) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Entrepre
neurs].
4. We asked our survey respondents (managers of recently started firms) whether they
believed they could use the courts to enforce contracts with customers or suppliers. In
Vietnam, just 9% said they could. In Romania, 87% said the courts were usable, in Poland
73%, in Slovakia 68%, in Russia 56%, and in Ukraine 55%.
5. See Telecommunications Policy Review 8 October 1995, p. 9.
6. See ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOlIT LAw {1991).

August 2000]

Private Order Under Dysfenctional Public Order

2423

guanxi.1 In Japan, according to Ronald Dore, firms' opportunism is
limited by "moralized trading relationships of mutual goodwill. The
stability of the relationship is the key. Both sides recognize an obliga
tion to try to maintain it. "8
In the right circumstances, then, private order can be achieved
spontaneously. In large, anonymous communities, however, where
people can enter and leave and where alternative trading partners are
readily accessible, spontaneous private order may not be feasible.
Anonymity strips reputational constraints of their power; more is
needed than social norms or self-enforcing dealings. Private order, if
it is to operate at all, needs to be organized.
Market participants thus sometimes form themselves into groups
such as trade associations to support contracting and create private
order. Profit-seeking firms also sometimes provide private order:
market intermediaries such as wholesalers and trading companies on
occasion supply, among other services, contractual assurance for buy
ers and sellers. We argue below that private-order organizations of
either kind have two roles in sustaining contracting: first, providing
information about breaches, and second, organizing the responses to
those breaches. Historical studies of notably diverse settings, from
medieval Europe to present-day Mexico, demonstrate a consistency in
this functioning of private-order organizations: a private organization
(such as a market intermediary or a trade association) disseminates in
formation about contractual breaches, and then coordinates the com
munity's response to them. The usual sanction is to boycott the of
fender.
These private-order organizations provide contract
enforcement mechanisms that lie between formal, state-supported or
der and informal, spontaneous order.
Private order unfortunately also has a down side. It sometimes
harms efficiency by excluding new entrants from trading or by
achieving price collusion. Private order also can cause or perpetuate
racial or gender discrimination. Additionally, some private-order or
ganizations' enforcement techniques overflow into criminal violence.
Because of these disadvantages, private order can usefully supplement
public law, but cannot replace it.
Our evidence comes from two sources. First, we review published
descriptions of private-order practices in various countries. In re
·

viewing this anecdotal evidence we aim to show how similar private
order mechanisms have arisen in quite diverse settings, from medieval
Europe to present-day Mexico. Second, we analyze data from the sur
veys of entrepreneurs we conducted in countries in the process of
transition to a market economy from central planning: Vietnam,

7. See Yao Souchou, The Fetish of Relationships: Chinese Business Transactions in
Singapore, SOJOURN 2, 1, 89-111 (1987).

8. RONALD DORE, TAKING JAPAN SERIOUSLY 173 (1987).

2424

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2421

Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland. In using this sta
tistical evidence, we aim to examine, in depth, how the legal system
affects the operation of private-order mechanisms, both spontaneous
and organized.
In Part I, we discuss why private order is needed and why it some
times needs to be organized, and argue that private organizations
serve two functions - to disseminate information about contractual
breaches and to coordinate the responses of multiple parties. We then
provide evidence in Part II to demonstrate when private order works
spontaneously and when it does not. In Part III, we present evidence
regarding the information provision and coordination roles of private
order organizations. In Part IV, we discuss evidence demonstrating
how private-order mechanisms interact with the formal legal system.
We conclude in Part V with a discussion of the downside of private
order, and argue consequently that public order sometimes is prefer
able to private order.
I.

REPEATED GAMES AND THE LAW

In this Part, we describe the role and emergence of relational, in
formal contracting (private order) in relation to the relative adequacy
of the existing legal system (public order). As a preliminary matter,
we then describe the different types of private order (spontaneous and
organized), the functioning of each, and, correlatively, when each type
arises. In the subsequent parts, we explore more fully when and how
these two types of private order function.
A.

The Law versus Relational Contracting

Many business dealings have the character of the prisoner's di
lemma. A seller can cheat by supplying inferior merchandise, and a
buyer can cheat by not paying its bills. The best outcome for both, of
course, is that neither cheats. In an isolated transaction, however,
both parties may have an incentive to cheat, leading to an outcome
that benefits neither.
There are two ways to counter the self-defeating incentives of the
prisoner's dilemma. One is the law. If the players can write binding
contracts in advance promising not to cheat, with a sufficiently severe
sanction for cheating, then it is rational not to cheat. The other coun
termeasure arises from repetition of the game, or relational contract
ing. Players may refrain from squeezing the last cent out of the cur
rent deal because they wish to do business in the future, either with
this particular trading partner or with others who could learn of this
behavior. Contracting thus becomes self-enforcing through the threat
of retaliation and consequent loss of business. In other words, the
shadow of the future can induce the trading partners to cooperate.
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If the legal system functioned perfectly, contracts would never
need to be self-enforcing. A frictionless legal system would always
work at least as well as relational contracting. In practice, however,
laws meant to provide contractual assurance sometimes do not exist,
and even when they exist, their application and enforcement may not
be cost-effective or even possible.
Some countries, especially developing and transition countries,
have inadequate legal systems. Writing good laws does not automati
cally solve the problem, for it takes years to create the institutions of a
functioning court system and to train judges and lawyers. Indeed, in
some countries rampant corruption renders the courts entirely unreli
able.
Even in countries with sophisticated legal systems, the law may not
work smoothly. For example, the transaction costs of appealing to the
law sometimes exceed the transaction costs of using relational con
tracting. Market participants have some advantages over judges in de
ciding whether commitments have been fulfilled.9 First, market par
ticipants possess greater expertise than courts in the monitoring of
other participants' conduct. Second, their decisions and actions can be
more nuanced than the binary decision that a court must make - that
of liability or no liability.10 Third, they can consider information that
cannot be introduced in court, such as impressionistic evidence about
business trends or judgments about the quality of items sold. They can
base their decisions on a firm's behavior over time, on probabilistic
patterns that would not be admissible evidence in court.
In countries with functioning legal systems, then, relational con
tracting can supplement the law by mitigating the transaction costs of
investigation and enforcement. In countries with dysfunctional legal
systems, on the other hand, relational contracting may replace the law
altogether. We shall investigate both situations.11
B.

Spontaneous versus Organized Contracting

The size of a community and the adequacy of existing market insti
tutions influences whether spontaneous order can arise, or whether

9. See David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 373, 415-17 (1 990). There are, of course, good reasons why certain kinds of evidence

are inadmissible. A cost of achieving the economic efficiencies that, on average, such prob
abilistic evidence produces is that sometimes in specific instances the outcome is unjust. The
law is designed to avoid specific injustices more than to produce outcomes that on average
promote efficiency.

10. For example, a finding of liability in one lawsuit may not have the same far-reaching
effects of a boycott by other market players, or of consequently restrained or narrowly tai
lored dealings with a party found guilty of breach.
11. See infra Part IV.
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spontaneous order is rendered ineffective and the order must there
fore be organized.
1.

Spontaneous Contracting

If a buyer and seller expect to deal with each other repeatedly,
each might refrain from cheating the other in order to maintain the
relationship. Whether the prospect of future business suffices to over
come the immediate incentive to cheat depends on the value attached
to any future returns. For cooperation to be consistent with self
interest, the interactions must be sufficiently frequent and future re
turns must not be discounted too heavily.
Spontaneous cooperation between two trading partners also re
quires them to be locked in with each other. If the buyer can easily
find another seller to deal with, the seller's threat to cut off future
business carries little weight.12 On the other hand, if firms are locked
in with their current trading partners, perhaps because they trade a
unique product or because of the difficulty of locating alternative
trading partners, the firms will make efforts to sustain their existing
relationships. This implies, incidentally, that spontaneous cooperation
is easier to achieve when market institutions are inadequate. Lock-in
prevails in underdeveloped economies with poor market information
or high transport costs. As the economy develops and market frictions
fall, the cost of breaking a relationship will also fall and firms will be
come less willing to cooperate with each other. Thus, more sophisti
cated economies can rely less on this type of spontaneous, lock-in rela
tional contracting.
2.

Organized Relational Contracting

If no lock-in exists and the two parties deal with each other only
infrequently, then cooperation will not further their interests. The
shadow of the future can still come into play in such a situation, how
ever, if the retaliation for a breach comes not only from the affected
party but also from other firms - that is, if community sanctions ap
ply.13 A firm will more likely pay its bills if it knows that its other
trading partners, current or potential, would otherwise refuse to do
business with it.

12 See Rachel Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System, 89 AM ECON.
REV. 830 (1996) for a model of the effects of lock-in on cooperation.
.

13. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM ECON. REV. 525 {1993) [hereinafter Greif, Contract
Enforceability]; Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical
and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL ECON. 912
(1994); Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV. ECON.
STIJD. 63 (1992).
.
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Although community sanctions sometimes can be invoked sponta
neously, they often need to be managed.14 For example, even in mar
kets with adequate information flow, the sheer size of the market may
mean that some players may not even learn about third-party contrac
tual breaches, and therefore not know when to enact sanctions. Or,
even where informational problems do not exist, the application of dif
ferential sanctions by uncoordinated market players may provide outs
for the breacher. In these situations, community sanctions do not
work without formal organization. This organization might be an in
dependent third party, such as a wholesaler or some other kind of
market intermediary, or it might be the firms themselves in combina
tion, like a trade association. These organizations serve to provide
both information about breaches and coordination of the community
response.
a. Providing Information. As a first matter, then, the enactment of
community sanctions requires the provision of information because
firms must know when a breach has occurred and who caused it. Pri
vate organizations can serve as convenient and effective repositories
of this information. In addition, by providing formal channels of
communication, an organization can reduce the likelihood of mistakes
in the transmission of this information. As anyone who has played the
children's "telephone game" can attest, stories change when they are
orally transmitted through a chain of people.15 As a result, reliable in
formation transmission depends on having only a few links between
the original source of the information and each recipient. This would
require every member of the group to communicate frequently with
every other member. This type of spontaneous communication may
be unlikely or even impossible in a large group, and organizations
therefore provide the most reliable means of information transmis
sion.16 These organizations may take the form of trade associations
formed by the actual market players, or of market intermediaries, such
as wholesalers.

14. We posit here that organized private order arises when market characteristics fore
close effective functioning (or even development) of spontaneous order. Of course, there
are situations where organized private order exists but may be dysfunctional, see infra Sec
tion II.A, and market players therefore revert to (or maintain) spontaneous order as the
primary mechanism for enforcing contracts. This phenomenon is unsurprising when one
considers the existence of private order in the face of an existing but dysfunctional formal
legal system.
15. In the telephone game, a long sentence is whispered from one person to another in a
group. The second person repeats the sentence to a third, the third to a fourth, and so on,
until everyone has heard the sentence. The last member then repeats what he or she heard,
usually uttering a sentence entirely unrelated to the original. On the idea that a formal or
ganizational structure reduces the likelihood of mistakes, see Joel Sobel, How to Count to
One Thousand, 102 ECON. J. 1 (1992).
16. This problem with the transmission of information provides another explanation for
the inability of relational contracting to be effective in larger groups.
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A trade association can effectively serve as a repository of infor
mation. A buyer, say, considering dealing with a new seller can go to
the information repository and check whether the seller has a history
of reneging on deals. In addition, a trustworthy party may be needed
to investigate any reports of cheating and assess which party to the
transaction actually cheated. A trade association (or other type of in
formation provider) can perform this task, and can also check the ve
racity of the offended firm's claim that it has been cheated (for exam
ple, claims of unpaid debts or delivery of low-quality goods).
Otherwise, sellers could use the threat of reporting to hold up inno
cent buyers, or vice versa.17
In the examples provided below,18 we will show that trade associa
tions must inspect their own members as well as those on the other
side of the transaction. If they imperfectly police their own membersj
then those members may use the threat of multilateral sanctions in
bargaining with their customers, thus undermining their own incen
tives. The key lies in verification of the claims of cheating. Having
verified, the organization might just publicize the cheating, or it might
take a more active role in generating punishment by community sanc
tions or some other route.
A wholesaler or market intermediary that deals with several cus
tomers can also have an effect similar to that of an information reposi
tory. If a seller produces a low-quality item, it risks losing not just the
customer who bought the good, but also other customers, if the whole
saler that handled the purchase ceases dealing with the seller. In addi
tion, if the wholesaler stocks multiple product lines, it has an incentive
to drop a reneging seller; otherwise its own reputation will suffer, with
consequent loss of sales in its other product Iines.19
Moreover, the benefit of intermediaries as information-providets
goes beyond the implementation of community sanctions. By in
specting the quality of a product and certifying it, intermediaries re
solve problems generated by asymmetric information about trading
partners' capabilities. The fact that intermediaries are prominent in
the marketplace and themselves have a reputation to maintain gives
them an incentive to carry out this certification honestly. Trading
through intermediaries generates a better match of buyers to sellers
than does unintermediated trade.20 If the intermediary is a monopo17. See Ronald J. Mann, Verification Institutions in Financing Transactions, 87 GEO. LJ.
2225, 2267-69 {1999); Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade:
The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL 21 {1990) re·
printed in REPUTATION 243 {Daniel B. Klein ed., 1994).
18.

See infra notes 74 to 80 and accompanying text.

19. See Gary Biglaiser & James Friedman,
INI"LJ. INDUS. ORG. 509 {1994).

Middlemen

as

Guarantors of Quality, 12

20. See Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman, Adverse Selection with Competitive In·
spection, 8 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1 {Spring 1999).
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list, this information provision and certification role may be attenu
ated; the monopolist might choose to reveal only partial information.
If sufficient competition exists among intermediaries, on the other
hand, complete information might be revealed.21

b. Coordination of Community Response. As well as information,
coordination is sometimes needed in enacting community sanctions.
Information and coordination are separable in principle though not in
practice: without information, coordination obviously cannot occur.
For private order to work, the issue is whether it suffices for market
participants to be informed of a breach, or whether, in addition, effec
tive sanctioning requires some coordination of their responses.
Coordination has two aspects. First, the repeated game has multi
ple equilibria; as in the standard prisoner's dilemma, many different
outcomes are consistent with everyone behaving rationally. Coopera
tion supported by the threat of community sanctions is not the only
possible outcome. Another equilibrium has everyone cheating. This
rests on a self-confirming prophecy: each player expects everyone else
to cheat, so each cheats, and everyone's expectations are fulfilled. An
effective initiation of cooperation faces an obstacle: it does not pay to
act in a trustworthy way unless you believe that everyone else will act
in a trustworthy way. Escape from an untrusting equilibrium requires
everyone to change his beliefs about others, and his own behavior, si
multaneously. Such a coordinated change is unlikely to occur sponta
neously if there is more than a handful of players; someone will have
to organize it.
Moreover, because most economic interactions can be more com
plicated than the standard prisoner's dilemma, there is an aspect to
this multiplicity of equilibria beyond the issue of achieving cooperative
outcomes. Complicated economic interactions indeed have a range of
efficient outcomes that can be achieved. So in addition to achieving
cooperation, there must also be a resolution of the issue of how to
share the gains from that cooperation. Squabbling over the division of
the spoils frequently causes agreements to break down. By developing
customary rules to govern exchanges, and perhaps even by offering
formal arbitration procedures, an organization can help prevent these
costly bargaining breakdowns.
The second aspect of coordination involves the resolution of the
free-rider problem. After a seller has cheated a buyer, other potential
buyers may have little incentive to join in the sanctioning of the
cheater. It furthers each individual's interest to let bygones be by
gones.22 But if all do that, there is no sanction. A formal organization

21. See Alessandro Lizzeri, Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries, 30
RAND J. ECON. 214 (1999).

22 See Dilip Abreu, On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting, 56
ECONOMETRICA383 (1988).
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may be needed to provide the discipline to prevent this free-riding
over punishment.
How, then, do private-order organizations address these two
problems? Organized private order means that any individual trader
need not have frequent (or any) contact with any other particular
trader in order for reliable information to be transmitted between the
two. Hence, more open groups are workable. Furthermore, an or
ganization increases the force of economic sanctions because it elimi
nates the need for future dealings to occur between any single pair of
traders. To sustain cooperation it is only necessary that a firm foresee
future dealings with some members of the group.
II.

WHEN SPONTANEOUS ORDER DOES, AND DOES NOT, WORK

Spontaneous cooperation may arise between two transactors or
among many. In this Part, we review anecdotal and empirical evi
dence on bilateral relational contracting.
A.

Bilateral Relational Contracting

Long-term bilateral relations are pervasive in less-developed coun
tries. In Moroccan bazaars, for example, the lack of an organized
market for information means that the "search for information one
lacks and the protection of information one has is the name of the
game."23 The result is a "clientalization" of the market where, for the
sake of assurance against being cheated, buyers habitually return to
the sellers they know, even if other sellers offer lower prices. In rural
Thailand, rice and rubber are marketed in different ways.24 Rice is
sold in impersonal auction markets, while rubber is traded via long
standing bilateral relationships between growers and buyers. The dif
ference between these two formats lies in the ability of the buyer to
assess the quality of the product. Whereas a buyer can immediately
assess the quality of rice, the quality of rubber becomes apparent only
several months later when it is processed. The buyer must trust the
grower to have carefully removed impurities; this trust rests on the
relationship.25
Vietnam's transitional economy provides a stringent test of the
workability of spontaneous private order because the legal system is
inadequate (or at least is perceived as such by market players) and the
economy is not yet far enough developed for private-order organiza-

23. Clifford Geertz, The Bazaar Economy: Information and Search in Peasant Market
ing, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 28, 28-30 (1978).
24. See Ammar Siamwalla, Farmers and Middlemen: Aspects of Agricultural Marketing
in Thailand, 29 ECON. BULL. FORAsIA& PAC 38, 41-44 (1978).
25. See id. at 44.
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tions to have been built. A survey of managers of small start-up firms
in Vietnam we conducted in 1995 showed the inadequacy of formal
contract-supporting institutions, both public and private.26 The man
agers we interviewed said that they did not believe the courts could
help them. "They normally just create more problems," said one.27
"[I]n Vietnam no one believes we have a good legal system."28 Ac
cording to another, "[t]he court is weak and no entrepreneurs use it."29
In responding to the inquiry on whether third parties exist that can en
force agreements with customers or suppliers, only 9% of those inter
viewed thought that a court or other government agency could help.30
Third parties provide even less help for disputes over the quality of
goods; only 2% of the managers said they would take such disputes to
court or appeal to local authorities.31 Moreover, trade associations do
not seem to play a major contracting role. While 47% of the surveyed
firms belong to a trade association, only 28% of these (or 13% of the
total) say that the association provides "information about the trust
worthiness of customers or suppliers," and only 13 % (or 6% of the to
tal) say that the association provides "contract and/or dispute resolu
tion."32
Most deals among Vietnam's firms, therefore, rest on
unorganized bilateral relational contracting.
Because bilateral relationships require some degree of lock-in be
tween the two parties,33 our survey also asked a series of questions
about the surveyed firms' first and newest customer relationship.34
These data provide evidence regarding the relevance of customer
lock-in for relational contracting. Using, as our measure of lock-in,
the number of sellers of similar products located within one kilometer
of the seller in question, we found that a seller's willingness to grant
trade credit to a customer is significantly related to the buyer's degree
of lock-in. A seller that has competitors nearby offers its customers
about fifteen percentage points less trade credit than one with no
nearby competitors.35
26. See John McMillan & Christopher Wo odruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in
Vietnam, 15 J.L ECON. & ORG. 637 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Pre
vention].
27. Id. at 640.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 641.
31. See id.
32 Id. at 649.
33. See supra text accompanying note 5.
34. See John McMillan & Christopher Wo odruff, Interfinn Relationships and Infonnal
Credit in Vietnam, 114 QJ. ECON. 1285 (1999) [hereinafter McMillan & Woodruff, Interfinn
Relationships].
35. See id. at 1299.
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Given that they are locked together, people can learn to trust each
other. Bilateral cooperation may evolve in relationships via a process
in which the potential loss from having a trading partner defect is kept
small in initial transactions and allowed to increase as the relationship
progresses. Our Vietnamese managers described such a process.
They said that they investigated potential trading partners before
starting a trading relationship by talking with the customer's neighbors
or other trading partners. But even with this pre-trading research, it is
difficult for managers to identify trustworthy customers at the outset.
Early in the relationship, the two sides of the trading relationship test
each other. As trading continues, experience with the trading partner
provides information. One manager explained that "[p]eople show
their personality through their actions in difficult times," so after a few
transactions this manager selected a few customers to concentrate
on.36 The data show that longer-lasting relationships involve signifi
cantly more trust. After two years of dealings, the amount of trade
credit offered is on average fourteen percentage points higher than at
the start of the relationship.37
Also, given that they are locked in, the firms may be able to design
the terms of each transaction so as to reduce the reliance on the
shadow of the future by reducing either party's immediate temptation
to renege. Setting the timing of payments right might achieve this, for
example. If a manufacturer must make some initial specific invest
ment in order to meet a buyer's needs, the gains from defection can be
balanced by having the buyer pay part or all of the bill in advance of
delivery. There is evidence that the Vietnamese firms structure their
transactions in this way.38
B.

Multilateral Relational Contracting

Bilateral relational contracting is not reliable if lock-in does not
exist between the two trading partners. Relational contracting may
still develop spontaneously, however, if community ties are strong
enough.
Communities of traders may derive social norms that encourage
cooperation between any two of their members. Interviewing ranch
ers in Shasta County, California, Robert Ellickson found that "most
residents resolve trespass disputes not according to formal law, but
rather, according to workday norms that are consistent with an over
arching norm of cooperation among neighbors."39 Among the rural

36. McMillan& Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 652.
37. See McMillan& Wo odruff, Interftrm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1306.
38. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 644-48.
39. EWCKSON, supra note 6, at 48.
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residents, interactions are frequent and residents expect them to con
tinue indefinitely into the future. The conditions for cooperation in a
repeated game are thus met.
Similarly, merchants in Mexican
California of the 1830s and 1840s, dealing with one another repeti
tively, enhanced the effect of reputation by communicating their expe
riences with one another.40 Given the small size of the community and
the frequency of interactions, gossip sufficed to keep traders honest.
Among New York City garment-manufacturing firms, interfirm rela
tionships promote cooperation, and thus reduce transactional uncer
tainty, facilitate the exchange of goods that are difficult to price, and
enable the creation of agreements that are difficult to enforce contrac
tually. These relationships often start from third-party referrals, and
often are based on social relationships outside business.41
Our data on Vietnamese firms show that network links among
firms engender cooperation.42 We asked managers how they first
learned about a customer before beginning to trade with it. If they re
sponded that they found the customer through "other similar produc
ers," "other suppliers," or business associations, we interpreted the
two firms to be connected by a business network. One-quarter of the
ongoing customer relationships in the sample were initiated through
such business links. Connections significantly increased cooperation:
a customer identified through a business network on average paid
10% to 20% more of its bills after delivery than did a customer identi
fied by other means.43 Similarly, in Africa, "firms that rely on informa
tion sharing to screen prospective credit recipients sell an additional
36% to 39% of their output on credit relative to others."44
Social sanctions can add to, or replace, economic sanctions in
helping to ensure cooperative behavior. Social norms and sanctions
have particular force in ethnic networks - linked by ties of culture,
language, or religion - because these networks possess the advantage
of having a wider range of methods of influence at their disposal than
do groups of merchants connected only by their commercial interests.
For example, an ethnic network provided the backbone for the elev-

40. See Karen Clay, Trade without Law: Private- Order Institutions in Mexican
California, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 202 (1997). Arguably the fact that trade was based on the
missions facilitated this process by limiting the number of sites for trade.
41. See Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 674 (1996).
42. See McMillan& Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1298.
43. See McMillan& Wo odruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1306.
44. Marcel Fafchamps, Ethnicity and Credit in African Manufacturing, 61 J. DEV. ECON
205, 229 (2000) .
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enth-century Maghribi traders' coalition.45 In Asia and Africa, firms
use ethnic ties to support transactions.46
In the precommunist Vietnam of the 1960s, business among the
merchants who were ethnic-Chinese (a well-defined category in
Vietnam) "was based upon personal relationships and word-of-mouth
agreements."47 If a merchant was untrustworthy, "it would be impos·
sible for him to do business. Once the fact that a merchant had failed
to honour his word became known, other merchants would simply ref·
use to do business with him."48 These relationships were specifically
ethnic-Chinese, and the inability of the ethnic-Vietnamese merchants
to establish trust among themselves was alleged to explain their "lack
of success in competing with the Chinese."49
Among the present-day Vietnamese firms we surveyed, however,
ethnic ties seemed less important. When asked how they first learned
about a customer before beginning to trade with it, 17% identified
family connections (a surprisingly small number given the conven
tional views about the dependence of Asian business on family), but
there was no significant extra amount of trust (as measured by trade
credit) in those trading relationships. Furthermore, 18% of the man
agers we interviewed said they could speak Chinese.50 If the existence
of a Chinese ethnic network depends on this language ability along
with the use of family connections, we found no significant tendency
for family-based contracting to be used in transactions with a higher·
than-average risk of reneging.51
Table 1 summarizes some studies of spontaneous cooperation.
These groups have several characteristics in common. They lack the
ability to implement formal sanctions, such as fines, although they
may, and generally do, rely on social sanctions as an enforcement
mechanism. These social sanctions usually operate through ostraciz.
ing or excluding members from the group. If this threat of exclusion is
to shape behavior, there must be "social profits" from future interac·
tion with the group, just as there must be economic profits for the
threat of exclusion to have pecuniary penalties. This may be one rea·
son that almost all of the groups on Table 1 are "closed" to the extent
that membership is limited by ethnicity or geography.
45. See Greif, Contract Enforceability, supra note 13, at 535-41.
46. See generally JANET TAI LANDA, TRUsr, ETIINICITY, AND IDENTITY (1994);
Fafchamps, supra note 44.

47. Clifton A. Barton, Trust and Credit: Some Observations Regarding Business Strategies
of Overseas Chinese Traders in South Vietnam, in 1 THE CHINEsE IN SOUTH VIE1NAM 53, 49
(Lim & Gosling eds., 1983).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See McMillan & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 651.
51. See id. at 650-51.
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TABLEl: SPONTANEOUSORDERING

Group

Author

Reference
Footnote

orcen or
c osed

One sided
or two?

Information or
coordination?

Maghribi

Greif
(1994)

13

Cosed

One

Information

26

Closed
Open

Two
Two

Information
Information

Clay
(1997)

41

Closed

Two

Information

Ellickson
(1991)

6

Closed

Two

Information

Landa
(1994)

47

Closed

Two

Information

Vietnam
manufacturers
Social networks
Business networks
California
merchants
Shasta ranchers
Singapore/Malaysia
Ethnic networks

McMillan/
Woodruff
(1999)

In sum, then, spontaneous relational contracting can work
bilaterally if the two trading partners are locked in with each other. In
the absence of lock-in, relational contracting requires the involvement,
not just of the two parties to the transaction, but of a community of
traders. Such community-based contracting can work spontaneously,
based on social norms or on social or business networks, in close-knit
communities with free flows of information. The market friction
needed to support spontaneous relational contracting exists in transi
tion economies such as Vietnam, which are characterized by thin mar
kets and high transportation costs. As the private sector develops and
infrastructure is improved, however, market friction decreases, mak
ing spontaneous order harder to sustain. As this occurs, more formal
systems of private ordering are necessary to sustain cooperation be
tween trading partners.
III. ORGANIZING PRIVATE ORDER
In this Part, we review evidence from published anecdotes and
from our own empirical studies that demonstrate how market players
organize private order. As discussed above, private organizations
serve two main functions in providing contract assurance: providing
information about breaches, and coordinating responses (that is, sanc
tions) to those breaches.
A.

Information Provision

In open communities of traders where entry and exit are frequent,
reliable information exchange is critical. How can new traders be
come quickly informed about the reliability of trading partners? How
can word about newcomers who cheat be spread quickly so that the
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gains of cheating are minimized?s2 Numerous examples from diverse
settings show how organized ordering increases the effectiveness of
reputation in controlling behavior.
Wholesalers of fresh fish in the United States used to suffer from
buyers' failure to pay their bills.s3 Relationships consequently devel
oped, so much so that one observer identified long-lasting bilateral
relationships as the defining characteristic of the industry: "[D]ealers,
wholesale firms and retail firms maintain longstanding ties to ensure
steady supplies and customers."s4 Nevertheless, despite the preva
lence of long-term relationships, "sharp practices are rife," according
to a 1984 study by James Acheson.
There are many stories in the industry about firms that have sent ship
ments of lobsters to distant parts of the country and then have had great
difficulties collecting their money. Other firms have sold lobsters to out
of-state trucking firms for a good price only to find that the check was no
good.ss

The buyers could easily find other wholesalers to buy from, so they
could get away without paying. Observing this, Neal Workman, an en
trepreneur in Portland, Maine, formed a firm called GoFish to act as a
debt-collection agency for the wholesalers. He soon realized that
there was unused value in the information that he was gathering.
"You can collect the bill once," he said. "You can sell the information
about the guy that doesn't pay over and over and over."s6 GoFish be
gan using the internet to provide fish wholesalers with credit informa
tion about deadbeat buyers. This changed the industry. According to
fish dealers, buyers now must pay their bills if they want to continue to
buy fish.
Two trade associations of footwear manufacturers in Mexico per
form a similar role in regulating trade between manufacturers and re
tailers.
The associations are located in the cities of Leon and
Guadalajara, which together account for three-quarters of the coun-

52. In an open network with no pre-screening, a trader will always be able to enter and
cheat once. This could be prevented in two ways. First, there might be some profit from
future trade within the network, giving an incentive for those who enter to remain after en
tering. Alternatively, it may be profitable for the network to use courts to sanction cheaters
even when the cost of doing so exceeds the recovery. That is, business networks or trade
associations may gain a reputation for punishing defectors as a means of preventing defec
tions. This could explain why (as shown in Part IV infra) business networks complement,
rather than replace, courts in Eastern Europe.
53. See James M. Acheson, The Social Organization of the Maine Lobster Market, in
MARKETS AND MARKETING 105-51 (Stuart Plattner ed., 1990).
54. Id. at 128.
55. Id. at117.
56. The GoFish story is on National Public Radio, Morning Edition, January 29, 1999,
available at <http://npr.org/news/business/1999/Jan/990129.fish.htrnl> (visited September 21,
2000).
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try's manufacturing.57 They offer two related services. First, each re
gional association maintains a database of information on the past be
havior of retail clients of their members. Did the retailers pay their
bills on time? Did they return an excessive amount of the merchan
dise, claiming it was defective? Did they cancel orders at the last min
ute, after goods had already been produced to fill them? A member
receiving an order from a retailer with whom he has never worked can
call the association and obtain a report on the retailer within 48 hours.
Communication among manufacturers is made easier because they are
geographically agglomerated. Second, both trade associations inter
vene to resolve disputes between manufacturers and retailers. Law
yers working for the associations travel regular routes throughout
Mexico, visiting the retailers who owe money, and filing court cases if
necessary.58 Representatives of the association in Leon, however,
claim that most disputes are resolved with a telephone call to the re
tailer. The association's power comes from its threat to put the re
tailer on a "clients in default" list that is sent to association members
every two months. These collection services complement the informa
tion gathering, since manufacturers gain directly from reporting delin
quent clients. Also, association lawyers traveling to collect accounts
from one client will often gather information on other clients. This in
formation is kept on file at the association and made available to
members.
In nineteenth-century Japan, contract-supporting information pro
vision was one of the main functions of trade associations.59 The
names of firms that reneged on agreements were posted on a black
board for everyone to see, so cheating resulted in immediate loss of
business. The courts were less effective then than they are now,60 but
organized information gathering is not limited to environments in
which courts are ineffective, and Japanese trade associations still per
form the same function. During the recession of the early 1990s,
wholesalers of heat-insulation materials faced an increase in fraudu-

57. See Christopher Woodruff, Contract Enforcement and Trade Liberalization in
Mexico's Footwear Industry, 26 WORLD DEV. 979, 982 (1998). The associations were most
effective when the market was closed to imports. For further discussion of this phenome
non, see id. at 984-86.
58. Using the courts in Mexico is possible, but problematic, according to manufacturers.
First, the action must be filed in the city where the retailer does business. This makes delay
tactics used by retailers' lawyers more costly. Second, judgments may be difficult to collect.
One manufacturer recounted that he had been awarded the retailer's automobile by the
court. However, since automobile titles were not registered electronically, there was no way
to put a lien on the car. The retailer sold the car before he could take possession of it. The
association representative reported that the most important role of the courts was to provide
certification of the loss for tax purposes.
59. See ULRIKE SCHAEDE, CoOPERATIVE CAPITALISM: SELF-REGULATION, TRADE
AssOCIATIONS, AND TIIEANTIMONOPOLY LAW IN JAPAN at chs. 5 & 7 (2000).
60. See id. at ch. 7.
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lent activity, with checks bouncing and customers disappearing after
receiving merchandise. To protect its members, the wholesalers' trade
association created a list of all its members' potential customers, indi
cating each one's creditworthiness. Dishonest companies were boy
cotted.
Credit bureaus similarly function as information repositories. For
most consumers, the knowledge that failure to pay a bill would dam
age their credit rating is sufficient incentive to ensure they pay their
bills.61
In the present-day Taiwanese footwear industry, trading compa
nies act as a "hub of information regarding the managerial and finan
cial condition" of manufacturers.62 The trading companies gather
similar information about the demands and reliability of buyers in the
United States and in Europe. Employees of a trading company often
stay in the factories to monitor quality while an order is being pro
duced. If disputes later arise between seller and buyer, the trading
company then has the information it needs to judge which party is at
fault. Are the goods defective, or is the buyer claiming a quality de
fect to avoid paying for goods she has decided she doesn't want? The
trading companies increase the effectiveness of reputation in two
ways. First, since each trading company works with many manufac
turers and many buyers, a manufacturer delivering merchandise late
or of low quality will lose business with many clients all at once. Sec
ond, other players in the industry learn which party was at fault in the
dispute (so long as the trading company can be trusted to be a fair
judge). Wholesalers and similar intermediaries perform similar func
tions in other markets as well.63

B.

Coordination

The separation of the two roles of private-order organizations information and coordination - is somewhat artificial. Since coordi
nation requires information in the first place, organizations often do
both. One can nonetheless independently assess whether the organi
zation engages in coordination as well as information provision. In

61. See generally Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A Model of
Credit Information Sharing, 4 ECON. & POL. 117 (1992).
62. You-tien Hsing, Trading Companies in Taiwan's Fashion Shoe Networks, 48 J. INr'L
ECON. 101, 106 (1998). Hubert Schmitz describes a similar role for wholesalers in Brazil's
footwear industry. See Hubert Schmitz, Small Shoemakers and Fordist Giants: Tales of a
Superc/uster, 23 WORLD DEV. 9, 14 (1995).
63. Banks appear to operate in a similar manner in the market for Letters of Credit
("LOCs"). According to Ronald Mann, sellers rarely comply strictly with the terms of
LOCs. The buyer's bank, however, will pressure the buyer to pay so long as the breach is
not material. Thus, payment through LOCs rests on the reputation of the bank rather than
on the formal legal system. See Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Letters of Credit in Payment
Transactions, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2494, 2525 (2000).
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Section III.A, we discussed organizations whose functions seem lim
ited to information provision. We now discuss organizations that ac
tively coordinate their members' responses to breaches of agreements.
Cooperation depends on history. If players have cheated each
other in the past, they will tend to continue to cheat each other. Thus,
cooperation requires coordinated action by all of the players to break
out of a low-level equilibrium. The European car industry provides an
example of a persistent inefficient equilibrium, and a coordinated at
tempt to break out of it. A report sponsored by the U.K. government
noted: "The mistrust which is in evidence is the result of many years
of broken promises, abuse of confidence, and general acrimony in the
industry."64 This was seen as raising the European industry's costs and
harming its competitiveness against U.S. and Japanese imports. In
1994, the two European trade associations, representing the car mak
ers and the components suppliers, launched an initiative "aimed at
improving the often hostile relations between the two sides of the mo
tor industry."65 The guidelines sought more transparency in negotia
tions over prices, greater cooperation in design and technology, and
quality improvement. While it was accepted that the guidelines "could
not give a legal or contractual definition to the relationship between
vehicle-makers and component suppliers," they were intended to pro
vide a "framework for cooperation."66
Providing information about those who cheat may not suffice to
deter cheating when punishment is costly - coordination may be re
quired to prevent free riding.67 For example, in interviews conducted
as part of our study of manufacturers in Vietnam, managers expressed
some hesitancy to use their full arsenal of sanctions, in part because
doing so would give them a reputation among their other customers of
being difficult to deal with. "[K]eeping a good reputation is the most
important thing," noted one manager.68 "[I]n Vietnam if you treat cus
tomers fairly when they have difficulties you will have that reputation.
People will do business with you because they think you will not kill
them when they have difficulties."69 It is apparently not enough for
the offended manager to determine whether the customer deliberately
defected; it must also be clear to his other customers or potential cus
tomers that the customer cheated. Managers expressed a similar con
cern about hiring private agencies to collect unpaid bills. When a

64. K.

Done & G. Tett, Peace Move in European Motor Industry, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13,

1994, at2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See supra Section I.B.2(a).
68. McMilla n & Woodruff, Dispute Prevention, supra note 26, at 643.
69. Id.
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wholesaler owed one of our interviewees 60 million dong ($5,500), the
interviewee considered hiring outside agents to collect his debt, but
decided against it because it would have harmed his relationship with
his other customers. He said, "in order to keep long-term relation
ships with other customers, the firm must be very careful in dealing
with disputes."70
In the absence of an incentive to participate in sanctioning, free
riding by traders weakens the ex ante incentive for cooperation. Pri
vate organizations can coordinate sanctioning by punishing those who
fail to carry out required punishments. An early mechanism for doing
this was the medieval law merchant.71 Law merchants had the power
to adjudicate disputes between trading partners, and set restitution to
be paid by the party at fault. They kept records of defecting traders
who had not made the payments set by the law merchant. This facili
tated information transmission by providing a central location in
which the past behavior of any potential trading partner could be
checked. But this system is effective only if the traders stay informed
by checking the status of each trading partner before trading with
them and refusing to deal with those not in good standing. Otherwise,
those who defect will not be fully sanctioned. Since checking on the
status of each potential trading partner is a costly activity, traders had
to be given an incentive not to free ride. Law merchants did this by
establishing the rule that traders who failed to check on the status of a
trading partner before transacting could not bring a case before the
judge. This gave traders an incentive to stay informed, and ensured
that the reputation of being a trader in good standing had more cur
rency.
Japanese banks use a clearinghouse to deter default.72 If a person
or firm dishonors a note or check twice during a six-month period, all
the financial institutions participating in the clearinghouse are re
quired, by the rules of the clearinghouse, to suspend transactions with
the defaulter for two years. Before the system was established in 1894,
banks had a loose understanding that they would inform each other of
defaults. The creation of the clearinghouse led to a substantial decline
in default rates, showing that the spontaneous order that had prevailed
evidently did not work as well as the organized private order of the

70. Id. at 644.
71. See Milgrom et al., supra note 17.
72 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of
Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 110-11 (1991); Marc Ryser, Sanctions without
Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine and Its Impact on Default Rates, in
REPUI'ATION 225 (Daniel B. Klein ed., 1997). Ramseyer views the role of the clearinghouse
as providing a commitment that the banks would actually carry out the prescribed punish
ments (that is, in our terms, its role is coordination). Ryser views it as a repository of data
about defaulters (that is, its role is information). As we have noted, the two roles are not
mutually exclusive.
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clearinghouse. The creation of the clearinghouse coordinated a shift
to a new equilibrium, involving increased cooperation among the
banks. The clearinghouse also helps address the free-rider problem
involved in punishment by making it harder for banks to continue
dealing with defaulters. Further, it serves as a repository of informa
tion about defaulters.73
Industry trade associations may coordinate the actions of their own
members as well. The Fur Dressers' and Fur Dyers' Association pro
vides one example of this.74 Operating in the United States in the
early 1900s, the association consisted of thirty members who per
formed 70% of the. cleaning and dyeing of fur pelts used in the manu
facture of garments. Association members complained it was "general
practice" for their clients (fur garment manufacturers) to claim that
furs had been damaged in the dressing and dyeing process, and the
damage claims were used to justify reductions in payments to dressers
and dyers.75 The small size of the transactions and the difficulty in de
scribing the agreed-upon quality level made use of the courts imprac
tical in resolving the disputes.
According to association bylaws, any manufacturer who did not
pay the full amount demanded by a dresser and dyer after delivery of
the merchandise was blacklisted directly by the harmed dresser/dyer.
Association members agreed not to do business with a blacklisted cli
ent unless they were paid in advance for services.76 Members of the
trade association, who had to post bonds of $500 upon joining, were
fined for any transactions with manufacturers currently blacklisted.
These fines helped overcome free-rider problems and strengthened
the enforcement mechanism.77
The ability of an individual member to blacklist, however, admits
the possibility of extortion: a dresser and dyer could force a garment
73. In its early days, the New York Stock Exchange certified the creditworthiness of
traders on the exchange and j udged disputes involving members and suspended members
found at fault, according to Stuart Banner. It also filled a gap in the formal laws. Traders
frequently engaged in "time bargains," or futures contracts, even though, until 1858, con
tracts for the sale of stock that the seller did not own on the contract date were legally void
in the state of New York, so these futures contracts were unenforceable in New York courts.
The stock exchange took on the role of forcing traders to comply with their futures con
tracts, with the penalty for breach being suspension or expulsion of members. See generally
Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J. LEGAL STuD.
113 {1998).

74. The association's activities are discussed in United States v. Fur Dressers' & Fur Dy
ers' Ass'n, 5 F.2d 869 (1925). This, and other similar cases, are also discussed in GEORGE P.
LAMB & SUMNERS. KrlTELLE, TRADE AssOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 96-105 {1956).
75. See LAMB & KrrrELLE, supra note 74, at 100.
76. In this case, the mannfacturer could make no ex post claim even if it were legitimate.

77. In a closed commun ity, norms might be used to overcome problems with proper en
forcement by members of the group. In Shasta County, Ellickson notes that "persons who
respond [to transgressions] with excessive force" are themselves punished by the community.
ELLICKSON, supra note 39, at 253.
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manufacturer to pay in full even when there were legitimate reasons
for a discount. Such an action, which would work to the detriment of
the overall association, suggests the need for the association to moni
tor its own membership as well. The monitoring might even be con
ducted informally. For example, in Mexico, footwear manufacturers
reportedly ignore complaints against retailers made by certain manu
facturers because those manufacturers are themselves viewed as unre
liable by the manufacturing community.78
Some trade associations use more formal methods of monitoring
their own members. The Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers Asso
ciation, for example, formed a subsidiary called the Dress Control Re
turns Bureau. The Bureau employed investigators to inspect all mer
chandise returned to manufacturers by retailers and certify that each
return was made because of legitimate quality defects.79 Retailers (cli
ents) who returned merchandise for any reason other than legitimate
quality defects, and who refused to pay for that merchandise, were
blacklisted by the manufacturers' association. The members of the as
sociation themselves were "coerced and compelled . . . to abide by
rules and regulations . . . under penalty of being required to pay . . .
fines in a substantial amount of money."80
Arbitration may also provide a method of enforcing standards and
coordinating equilibria.
For example, the New York Diamond
Dealer's Club "facilitates the transmission of information about deal
ers' reputations and, at least with respect to members, serves both a
reputation-signaling and reputation-monitoring function."81 A typical
transaction in the diamond industry involves the transfer between
traders of bags of diamonds worth millions of dollars, but without any
written contract. Upon joining the association, members must sign an
agreement that they will submit all disputes to arbitration. The "Floor
Committee" (the arbitral body) can exact a fine up to $1,000 and sus
pend a member's trading privileges for twenty days. Both the amount
of the fine and the rationale for reaching the decision are kept secret,

78. See Woodruff, supra note 57, at 986.
79. See Popular Priced Dress Mfg. Group, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 1608 (1951). The association
"employed and now employ[s], investigators to investigate the return by retailers of all la
dies' dresses to the manufacturers thereof and to ascertain whether or not said returns are in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by . . . [the] Popular Priced Dress
Manufacturers Group, Inc
Id. at 1612.
. • . ."

80. In re Nat'! Coat & Suit Recovery Bd. 47 F.T.C. 1552 (1950). The Film Board of
Trade carried out similar monitoring of their members. See United States v. First Nat'! Pic
tures, Inc., 34 F.2d 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd, 282 U.S. 44 (1930). The monitoring of mem
bers in these cases may have extended beyond that needed for contract enforcement. Ac
tions by these and other associations allowed under the National Industrial Recovery Act
were later deemed to constitute restraint of trade.
81. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out ofthe Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 121 (1992).
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but unpaid fines are posted.82 The arbitration board also has the
power to suspend or expel a member from the association.83
In the grain industry, the arbitration board of the National Grain
and Feed Association indeed provides more effective enforcement of
contracts (than do courts) for a novel reason, argues Lisa Bernstein.
While courts search for "immanent business norms" to guide dispute
settlements, the trade association arbitrators strictly apply the terms of
the contract. This allows trading partners to structure contracts on
two levels, with a set of rules ("norms") governing relationships in the
cooperative phase, and a set of rules (contracts, or "end-game norms")
governing relationships in the defection phase. These two sets of rules
allow trading partners to sustain cooperation under a broader set of
circumstances. The failure of the courts to more strictly enforce the
contracts, on the other hand, undermines cooperation. In this exam
ple, private ordering substitutes for the formal legal system not be
cause it has a better understanding of industry practices, but because it
has a better understanding of the theory of contract.
* * *

Table 2 summarizes cases of organized private ordering from the
literature. The organized institutions divide along several characteris
tics. Some institutions provide only information, while others sanction
their own members for failure to sanction defectors. Those providing
only information allow their members' trading partners more latitude
to maintain strong relationships with some members even while they
cheat others. Those that sanction their own members provide a
stronger incentive for cooperation.

82. According to Bernstein, the secrecy of the arbitration rulings enables a trader to
"minimize the reputation cost of his breach." Id. at 126. Thus the fine imposed by the arbi
trator is the sanction against defecting. Traders are not doubly punished by reputation sanc
tions as well.
83. See generally id. Numerous other trade associations provide arbitration services to
their members. These associations generally have memberships comprised of traders on
both sides of the transaction. Among these are the American Spice Trade Association and
the National Grain and Feed Association. See HANDB OOK, BY-LAWS, AND CONTRACT
RULES OF THE AMERI CAN SPI CE TRAD E ASSOCIATION (1936). See also Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Nonns, 144 U. P A. L. REV. 1765, 1771 (1996).
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TABLE 2: ORGANIZED INSTITUTIONS
Group

Author

Reference
Footnote

orcen or
c osed

One sided
or two?

Information or
coordination?

NGFA

Bernstein
(1996)

84

Open

Two

Coordination

Diamonds

Bernstein
(1992)

82

Closed

Two

Coordination

Mexican footwear

Woodruff
(1998)

58

Open

One

Information

Taiwan footwear

Hsin
(1998

63

Open

Independent

Information

Milhaupt/
West
(1999)

115

Closed

Independent

Coordination

17

Open

Independent

Coordination

Greif/
Milgrom/
Weingast

115

Open

One

Coordination

NYSE

Banner
(1998)

74

Open

Two

Coordination

Japanese banking
clearinghouse

Ryser
(1997)

73

Open

One

Coordination

Japan mafia

Law merchant

Merchant Guild

�

Milgrom/

North/
Weingast
(1990)

US trade associations (not previously published)
Fur dressers/dyers

75

Open

One

Coordination

Popular Priced
Dress Association

80

Open

One

Coordination

GoFish

57

Open

One

Information

Note: Open means there are no significant restrictions to becoming a member of the institution; closed means there are significant restrictions.

A second way in which the organized institutions differ is that
some are primarily interested in actions that are verifiable, while oth
ers are interested in actions that are observable to the parties involved
in the transaction, but which are not verifiable by those outside the
transaction. Credit bureaus and some trade associations, for example,
are interested primarily in whether or not sellers actually deliver
goods and buyers pay for them. Once the information is gathered,
third parties can verify these actions by examining shipping receipts,
canceled checks, and so on. Where courts function poorly, the trade
associations reduce the cost of transmitting information about such
behavior.
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The trading companies in Taiwan and the arbitration boards at
trade associations provide examples of institutions involved in dis
putes that are observable but not verifiable. The Taiwanese trading
companies, for instance, certify the quality of footwear delivered.
Since the precise quality level agreed upon proves very difficult to
write down, trading companies cannot provide information which al
lows third parties not involved in the transaction to verify which party
is at fault in a dispute. To be effective, then, the trading companies
must have some incentive to be impartial in their judgments - and
their own reputation in the market provides this. Two-sided member
ship in trade association (that is, both buyers and sellers) may provide
a similar incentive for fairness.

IV. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ORDER
How does the presence of the legal system, or its absence, affect
the operation of private-order mechanisms? In advanced economies
with well-functioning legal systems, courts underpin existing private
order mechanisms. Bargaining occurs in the shadow of the law; the
law shapes agreements even if they operate without appealing to it.
Even when it does not work well, a formal legal system can sometimes
help spontaneous private order work. The ability to damage a trader's
reputation works as a sanction even if the court's coercive enforce
ment powers are weak.
In China in the early 1990s, for example, lawyers who specialized
in debt collection maintained good relations with the local press and
would then threaten debtors with publicity.84 The unworkability of of
ficial enforcement mechanisms meant that even the courts sometimes
did this. Courts in the province of Heilongjiang, for example, threat
ened newspaper exposure of debtors who failed to pay. This appar
ently worked in the big cities, and particularly with enterprises wishing
to protect a reputation they had built through expending huge sums of
advertising money.85
Private order can serve as either a complement to or a substitute
for public order. Private order provides a complement (or a substi
tute) to the law if an improvement in the law generates an increase (or
a decrease) in the marginal value of private order. An improvement
in the law will increase the use of complementary private-order
mechanisms; it will similarly decrease the use of substituting private
order mechanisms. Which type of private order exists in any given
system is an empirical question.

84. Private conversation with Donald C. Clarke, Professor of Law, University of
Washington.
85. Id.
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Countries making a transition from a centrally planned to a market
economy provide an experimental forum to study how the various
contract-assurance mechanisms interact. Certainly legal systems have
been created there, and many companies indeed express faith in them,
but trade associations, informal netWorks, wholesalers, and reputation
also still have a profound effect on contracting. In this Part, we tum to
evidence from a survey of manufacturing companies carried out in
Poland, Slovakia, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine.86 We use these
survey data to determine whether a manager's use of social networks,
business networks, wholesalers, and/or reputation depends on his faith
in the ability of courts to enforce contracts with trading partners.
A.

The Data

As determined by managers' perceptions, the courts in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union are more effective than those in
Vietnam. The survey asked the managers about the ability of courts,
other government agencies, or private parties to enforce contracts
with customers and suppliers. Overall, just over two-thirds (68%) of
those surveyed said courts could enforce contracts with customers.
(Eighty-seven percent of the Romanian managers, 73 % of the Polish
managers, 68% of the Slovakian managers, 56% of the Russian man
agers, and 55% of the Ukrainian managers said the courts were effec
tive.)87 This reflects a much higher confidence in the court system in
these countries than exists in Vietnam.88
Similarly, trade associations seem to underpin contracting in these
countries more than they do in Vietnam. Although the survey gave us
little direct indication of the role of organizations other than courts in
contracting, overall two-fifths89 of the managers said they belong to
trade associations that provide important services: information about
the location of new suppliers and/or customers; information about the
trustworthiness of suppliers and/or customers; or arbitration services.
In Vietnam, by comparison, 26% of the firms belong to trade associa
tions that offer some sort of contracting support.90 Wholesalers inter-

86. This survey asks questions similar to those asked in the Vietnam survey discussed
above. See supra Part II.
87. See Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational Contracts (Sept. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts].
88. See supra text accompanying notes 26 to 29.
89. The actual numbers, by country, were 44% in Romania, 21 % in Poland, 23% in
Slovakia, 60% in Russia, and 64% in the Ukraine.
90. The membership percentage for Vietnam given here differs from that given in Sec
tion II.A because we have included "information about new customers and suppliers" as
contracting support. Just over 12% of the Vietnamese firms belong to a trade association
providing information about new trading partners without providing the other contracting
services.
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mediate more a higher percentage of sales (10%) in Vietnam than in
Romania (7%), Russia (5%), or Ukraine (4%). They are much more
likely to intermediate transactions in the most advanced or the East
ern European economies - Poland (26%) and Slovakia (19% ). With
the possible exception of Vietnam, this ranking coincides with these
countries' relative degrees of institutional development.91
We find that both the courts and trade associations have a signifi
cant effect on business trust in Eastern Europe. A firm that finds
courts effective is on average 9% more likely to grant its customers
trade credit than one that says the courts are ineffective. A firm that
belongs to a trade association providing contract-supporting services is
6 % more likely to offer trade credit than one that does not.92 These
numbers demonstrate the relevant role that these institutions play in
providing contractual assurance.
Spontaneous relational contracting also plays a significant role.
From our data we can identify two types of relational contracting the use of social networks and the use of business networks. The sur
vey asked a series of questions about the firms' longest-running and
newest customer relationships, and also identified how the manufac
turer first made contact with the customers identified in the survey. In
particular, we know whether the trading partners are managed by
family members or by people who were friends of the manufacturer
before their trading relationship began. In both these scenarios we
identify the relationship as one that arose from a social network.
About 17% of the customer relationships arose from social networks.93
Almost half (45%) of the time, however, initial information about cus
tomers came from business networks - suppliers, other customers, or
competitors of the manufacturer.94 Both social and business networks
increase information flow and make sanctions possible.
In addition to providing information about the ability to use formal
institutions and to rely on networks for contractual assurance, the sur
vey gives some indication about how well reputation functions. With
respect to customers, manufacturers were asked: "If your company
had a dispute with this customer, would other suppliers of this cus
tomer find out about it?" and "If this customer had a dispute with an
other firm, would your company find out about it?"95

91. For evidence of these countries' relative institutional development by a variety of
criteria, see Johnson et al., Entrepreneurs, supra note 3, at 4-13.
92. See Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts, supra note 87.
93. See id.
94. Regardless of the initial source of information, 14% of the customers are identified
as wholesalers. See id.
95. Word gets around. In 28% of the relationships for which we have complete data
{618 of 2184), the manager said a customer's other suppliers would hear about a dispute. In
39% (854 of2184), managers said they would hear about any transgressions of their custom
ers.
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We find that these forms of relational contracting, like the courts
and trade associations, also have a significant effect on business trust.
Customer lock-in matters: having one fewer competitor located
nearby raises the probability of offering credit by 3%. More trust ex
ists in longer-lasting relationships: three years after the start of a rela
tionship, the probability of credit increases by 18%. Customers identi
fied through business networks are 13% more likely to receive credit,
and those identified through social networks are 14% more likely to
receive credit, than customers identified without the help of net
works.96
B.

The Interaction ofPublic and Private: Analyzing the Data

We now use these data to ask how the courts, trade associations,
informal networks, and reputation interact in supporting contracting.
We do this with a series of regressions (reported in Table 3). We
asked firms about both their oldest and newest customers, so the sam
ple includes two observations per firm. The questions indicating
membership in a trade association and belief in the effectiveness of
courts relate to characteristics of the firm rather than of the individual
relationships between the manufacturers and their customers. To cor
rect for the biases in the standard errors created by the mismatched
aggregation of data, we use a random-effects probit model. In addi
tion to the variables of interest reported in Table 3, all the regressions
include a set of variables which control for firm and manager charac
teristics, and a series of dummy variables for each of eight industries in
each of the five countries. These variables are described in the notes
to Table 3.

96. Johnson et al., Courts and Contracts, supra note 87.
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TABLE 3: lNTERACTIONS OF USE OF NETWORKS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Random Effects Probits - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Manufacturer
Customer Customer
learns about
identified
identified
Customer
customer's
by business by social is wholesaler
other disputes
network
network

Customer's
other suppliers
learn about
disputes

Customer is
located
in a different
city

0.172
(2.57)

-0.157
(1.93)

-0.035
(0.42)

-0.27
(3.59)

-0.073
(0.91)

-0.101
(1.38)

0.009
(0.14)

0.073
(0.92)

-0.188
(2.18)

0.227
(3.04)

-0.005
(0.07)

0.042
(0.58)

Customer
identified
through business network

0.318
(5.06)

0.124
(1.92)

-0.195
(2.99)

Customer
identified
through social
network

0.295
(3.42)

-0.099
(1.08)

-0.436
(4.62)

Customer is
wholesaler

-0.088
(1.02)

0.02
(0.23)

0.542
(6.25)

2184

2184

2231

Courts are
effective
Member of
trade association

Number of
observations

2381

2381

2381

Note: Regressions also include three variables measuring characteristics of the firm's manager (age, years
of schooling, and a variable indicating that the manager previously worked as a high-level manager
in a state-owned enterprise) , three variables measuring characteristics of the firm (log age of firm,
log of the number of employees, and an indicator that the firm was started from scratch rather than
spun off from a state-owned firm), and 39 industry/country dummy variables.

Taking the manager's attitude toward the effectiveness of courts
and membership in trade associations as given, we first ask how these
affect the use of business networks, social networks, and wholesalers.97
Managers who express confidence in the courts are more likely to use
business networks and less likely to use social networks to identify cus
tomers. The first effect is significant at the 0.01 level, the second at the
0.10 level. Trade association members are less likely to have custom
ers who are wholesalers. There is also a negative relationship between
confidence in courts and the use of wholesalers, though this effect is

97. Whether the manufacturer is a member of a trade association might also be taken as
an endogenous variable, dependent on the ability to use courts. Given that a trade associa
tion providing customer/supplier services exists in the manufacturer's industry, the manufac
turer can choose whether to join or not. We find no significant relationship from belief in
courts to membership in a trade association in the data (B= 0.019, t= 0.60, result not shown
on table). It is also possible that belief in the effectiveness of courts is itself affected by
membership in trade associations, or the use of business or social networks. We are unable
to identify appropriate instruments in the survey to address this possibility. But the regres
sions do include controls for variables that affect the ability to use courts, including the size
and age of the firm the age and education of the manager, and the industry and country in
which the firm is located.
,
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not statistically significant. These results suggest that firms use social
networks and perhaps wholesalers as substitutes for courts, but use
business networks in conjunction with courts.
The amount of information a manufacturer possesses about his
customers depends on how much effort the manufacturer expends on
information gathering and on the difficulty of gathering that informa
tion. Institutions like trade associations make information gathering
less costly, leading to traders who are better informed about their
trading partners' past behavior. We find that both trade associations
and networks result in manufacturers' being better informed. Mem
bers of trade associations are more likely to say that they would learn
about their customers' disputes with other manufacturers, although
not that the customers' other suppliers would learn about disputes.
Manufacturers are also more likely to be better informed when the
customers came from business or social networks. Manufacturers who
believe that courts are effective, however, are less likely to say that
they would know if their customers had disputes with other trading
partners.
Together, these results present a coherent picture. Trade associa
tions and networks lower the cost of information gathering, resulting
in better-informed manufacturers. Effective courts, on the other
hand, lower the benefit of information gathering, resulting in less well
informed manufacturers.
Social networks and reputation appear
therefore to serve as substitutes for functioning legal systems, while
business networks function better when courts are effective.
Whether the customers are located in the manufacturer's same
city, in a different city in the same country, or in another country
might affect contracting. Geographic distance adds to the complexity
of relationships, making shipping, payment, quality inspection, and
other issues more difficult. The last regression in Table 3 explores the
use of public and private ordering to support trade over long distance.
Both business and social networks are strongly and significantly asso
ciated with trading locally, suggesting that geographic proximity
makes reputation easier to communicate.
We find no evidence that either courts or trade associations sup
port long-distance trade. Those who believe courts are effective are
more likely to trade locally, and those who are members of trade asso
ciations are more likely to sell to distant buyers, but neither effect is
significant. Long-distance trade is instead supported by wholesalers.
Customers located in distant cities are much more likely to be whole
salers than are local customers.98 Our data likely underestimate the

98. The regressions use data for only two of the manufacturer's customers. Other data
from the survey support the role of wholesalers in long-distance trade as well. We find a
very strong positive correlation between the percentage of the manufacturer's overall sales
that are made to wholesalers and the percentage of overall sales that are made outside the
manufacturer's city ( 0.21, p < 0.0001).
=
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importance of wholesalers in supporting trade over distance, since
wholesale customers located in the manufacturer's city likely sell some
part of their purchases in distant cities. These sales would not show up
as sales in distant cities in our data. Hence, while we find no correla
tion between courts and trade associations, on the one hand, and sell
ing over long distances on the other, we do find evidence of a strong
role of wholesalers in supporting trade over long distances. This is the
case even though wholesalers have not yet become a significant force
in the five surveyed countries. Overall only 12% of manufacturers'
sales are made through wholesalers.
Finally, we consider what the data illustrate about when firms take
their customers to court. The survey asked firms if a customer had
ever failed to pay them or if a supplier had ever refused to accept the
return of defective merchandise. The majority of firms (80%) re
ported having had at least one such dispute with a trading partner,
most of which (86%) involved a dispute with a customer. We focus
here on the manufacturer-customer disputes.99 Courts were used in
the resolution of 37% of these disputes.100 In 86% of the cases where
the court was used, the relationship with the customer ended; the rela
tionship ended only 53 % of the time when the court was not used.
This difference may reflect the severity of the dispute. Manufacturers
reported that the debt owed by the customer was collected in full in
28% of the cases in which the court was involved and in 40% of the
cases when the court was not used. On the other hand, the debt was
written off completely 26% of the time when courts were used and
only 12% of the time when courts were not used. This suggests either
that courts are so ineffective as to be detrimental to recovery, or that
the court was more likely to be used for more difficult disputes.
Table 4 shows the results of probit regressions with actual use of
the courts as the dependent variable. Here, we are most interested in
knowing whether membership in a trade association, reliance on busi
ness and social networks, use of wholesalers, and belief in the reputa
tion mechanism are correlated with the decision to use courts. The re
sults indicate that firms that are members of trade associations use
courts more often, but the effect is not statistically significant. We do
find evidence (consistent with the Table 3 results) that courts and
reputation substitute for one another. Court use is less likely among
firms who say that other suppliers of the customer would hear about
disputes. (It is not clear in which direction the causation runs here.)

99. The survey instrument used in Russia and the Ukraine does not allow us to deter
mine whether the reported dispute was with a customer or a supplier. We therefore exclude
the data from these two countries from the sample used in the regressions reported in Table
4.
100. The survey did not ask for what purpose courts were used. Thus, we do not know if
courts helped resolve disputes, or simply certified losses.
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Neither networks nor wholesalers have significant associations with
court use.101
The probit regressions in Table 4 include several other control
variables. Not surprisingly, we find that court use is more likely
among firms expressing a belief that courts are effective. The regres
sions also control for how long the two firms had traded before the
dispute arose, where the trading partner is located (in the same city as
the manufacturer or not), and whether the trading partner is a private
firm or a state-owned enterprise, as well as a set of manager and firm
controls described in the notes to Table 4. Among these additional
variables (which are not shown in the table), only the size of the inter
viewed firm and the duration of the relationship before the dispute oc
curred are significant. Larger firms are more likely to have used
courts. Disputes are also more likely to end in court when the two
trading partners had dealt with each other for a longer period of time
before the dispute occurred, perhaps reflecting an increase in the
complexity of trading relationships over time. The first regression
controls for whether or not the two firms are still trading partners; the
second regression removes this control.

101. The lack of a significant association between networks and the use of courts may
reflect the indirectness of our measure. We do not know how the customer involved in the
dispute was identified, or whether this customer is a wholesaler. We know only whether the
surveyed manufacturer used social and business networks to identify his oldest and newest
customer, and the percentage of his sales that is made to wholesalers. Thus, our measures
provide a noisy indication of the interaction between use of courts on the one hand and net·
works and wholesalers on the other.
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TABLE 4: PROBIT FOR USE OF COURT
Did manufacturer use courts in
most recent dispute with customer?
Member of trade association

0.063
(1.11)

0.048
(0.88)

Reliance on business networks

0.002
(0.05)

0.016
(0.47)

Reliance on social networks

-0.055
(1.06)

-0.065
(1.30)

-0.0003

-0.0001

(0.33)

(0.10)

0.023
(0.60)

0.021
(0.57)

-0.081
(2.04)

-0.064
(1.70)

Courts are effective

0.161
(2.69)

0.167
(2.84)

Relationship ended

0.421
(7.86)

Number of observations

499
0.243

Percent of sales through wholesalers

Manufacturer knows if customer

has a dispute with another trading

partner
Customer's other suppliers learn
of disputes

pseudo R-square

499
0.136

Notes: Data for Poland, Slovakia and Romania only. Regressions also include 3 manager
and 3 firm characteristics variables (see the note to Table 3 for a description), and
variables measuring the duration of the relationship before the dispute occurred, a
dummy indicating the trading partner is located in the same city, or is an SOE, and
23 country/industry dummies. Reliance on social (business) networks is measured
from 0 to 4
the number of the 4 trading partners identified in the survey. The
survey identifies the oldest and newest customer and the oldest and newest supplier.
The three reputation measures are based on responses to questions related to the
oldest and newest customer.
-

* * *

In sum, we find evidence from our survey of small-firm managers
in Poland, Slovakia, Romania, the Ukraine, and Russia that social
networks and reputation act as substitutes for effective courts. Manu
facturers who reportedly find courts ineffective are more likely to use
social networks to locate trading partners, and more likely to remain
informed about the behavior of their trading partners. Trade associa-
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tions and business networks are also associated with a better flow of
information about the behavior of trading partners. But rather than
acting as substitutes for courts, business networks are more often used
in concert with the legal system.
V.

THE DOWNSIDE OF PRIVATE ORDER

Private-order mechanisms have costs as well as benefits. Their dis
advantages range from economic inefficiencies of exclusion and collu
sion to social costs of racial discrimination and criminal violence.
We have seen that private order can support exchanges when mar
ket players cannot rely on the courts. Private order therefore pro
motes economic efficiency by giving businesspeople the confidence to
transact. But it also creates economic inefficiencies in two ways. First,
spontaneous private order necessitates exclusion. The corollary of
ongoing relationships is a reluctance to deal with firms outside the re
lationship, and exclusion clearly can result in inefficiencies. Second,
organized private order, changing the relative bargaining powers of
buyers and sellers, can create the inefficiencies of monopolistic pric
ing.
Consider first the exclusion costs of spontaneous private order.
Closed networks have an obvious drawback. Dealing only with a lim
ited group limits private-sector growth. Entrepreneurial talent is
wasted, as potentially productive entrepreneurs are prevented from
setting up firms. Even if they can get started, efficient firms may be
unable to grow, since potential new customers would not look beyond
their current suppliers.
The managers we interviewed in Vietnam and Eastern Europe ex
pressed a hesitancy to deal with trading partners with whom they had
never dealt. Regarding both their longest-term supplier and their
newest supplier, manufacturers were asked: "If another firm you have
never purchased from offered to supply this input for a price 10% less
than your current supplier, would you purchase from the new firm?"
Three possible answers were offered: buy entirely from the new sup
plier, reject the new supplier, and buy from the new supplier but con
tinue buying from the existing supplier as well. In Eastern Europe
(Vietnam), only 38% (29%) of our respondents gave the response that
simple economics would suggest, saying they would accept the bar
gain; 45% (53%) said they would buy from the new supplier while
continuing to buy at the higher price from their accustomed supplier;
and 17% (19%) said they would reject the lower-priced offer outright.
In evaluating these responses, the success of the relationship must
be weighed against the failure of the market. In a (hypothetical) mar
ket with perfect information and complete contracting, the buyer
would have no reason to be suspicious of a low-priced offer, and
would always accept it. If there is uncertainty about the reliability of
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the new supplier, however, it could be rational to reject the apparently
better deal. This situation could arise in any economy, but is espe
cially likely when the law is dysfunctional. Firms' unwillingness to
take the risk of working with a new supplier, even for a much lower
price, however, sometimes means foregoing a genuinely better deal.
The fact that only 29% of our respondents said they would switch to
buying from a new supplier offering a 10% lower price implies that
considerable inefficiencies exist in this market.
How do courts and informal contract enforcement affect a firm's
willingness to switch suppliers? Controlling for the complexity of the
good produced, regressions using the data discussed in Part IV show
that those who find courts effective are 6% less likely to reject the deal
outright, and those who are members of trade associations are 9% less
likely to reject the deal outright. Business networks have no signifi
cant effect on the propensity to switch. But where the initial contact
came through social networks, we find some evidence that manufac
turers are more likely to reject the new deal completely. Rejecting the
deal is also more likely when the manufacturer's "other suppliers
would learn about a dispute with this supplier."102 We conclude that
social networks and reputation have a dampening effect on market
forces.
How does public order or organized private order affect the exclu
sionary costs of spontaneous private order? We showed in the regres
sions reported in Table 3 that market players will more likely use so
cial networks and reputation when they cannot rely on the courts.
These mechanisms, however, exact the highest cost in terms of ex
cluding potentially efficient new entrants. Trade associations have fa
vorable effects, and informal business networks negligible effects, on
exclusion. But the evidence in Tables 3 and 4 indicates that firms use
business networks and, to a lesser extent, trade associations in con
junction with courts. Thus, while firms may find substitutes for dys
functional legal systems, public policy should not equally encourage all
of these substitutes.
The exclusion costs of spontaneous private order arise in bilateral
relationships with lock-in or in closed networks, such as ethnic or so
cial groups, where entry and exit are inherently difficult or impossible.
Exclusion costs do not exist in open networks that allow entry and
exit, such as networks of firms in a similar line of business. But in
open networks, private order must be organized. Organized private
order can give rise to another kind of economic inefficiency by push
ing the bargaining power of sellers and buyers out of balance.
Exclusion obtained through continued dealings with the same
trading partners and reliance on social connections sometimes results

102. McMillan & Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships, supra note 34, at 1308; Johnson et
al., Courts and Contracts, supra note '67, at Table 6.

2456

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2421

in more than missed business opportunities; it can result in discrimina
tion against certain groups in society.103 In Kenya and Zimbabwe,
firms' reliance on the existing networks, while arguably done simply to
facilitate contracting and not to express any preference for discrimina
tion, nevertheless creates ethnic and gender bias.104 In the white
dominated New York construction industry, African-American con
tractors attempting to break in are reportedly hindered by the existing
social ties.105 One entrepreneur complained that he could not win con
tracts because he was "not in the social circles where those kinds of
deals are made"; he could not "play golf or go on boats with peo
ple."106
In addition, the ability to organize contract enforcement some
times becomes the ability to collude. "Merchants of the same trade
seldom meet together, even for merriment or diversion, but the con
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contriv
ance to raise prices," according to Adam Smith's famous dictum.107
Private-order organizations that share information about customers
and coordinate firms' actions will find it relatively easy to fix prices.
In Japan, for example, firms regularly use trade associations to organ
ize price-fixing conspiracies, to the cost of their customers.108
The extent of price-fixing power depends on the nature of the pri
vate-order organization. Some private-order organizations are neutral
intermediaries, favoring neither buyers nor sellers. The medieval law
merchants,109 the Taiwanese trading companies,110 and the New York
diamond-traders association111 provide examples of this. These in
clude both buyers and sellers as members or as clients. Some of these
are constrained, moreover, by facing competition from other organiza
tions performing similar functions; the Taiwanese trading companies
provide an example of this. Other private-order organizations, how
ever, are one-sided, favoring (usually) sellers over buyers. The medie-

103. See Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Per
sistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1 (1996).
104. See Fafchamps, supra note 44, at 205.
105. See Alejandro Portes & Patrica Lanolt, The Downside of Social Capital, AM.
PROSPECT, May-June 1996, at 18.
106. Id. at 20.
107. ADAM SMITH, 1 AN ENQUIRY INTO TIIE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 144 (1976).
108. See Schaede, supra note 59, at ch. 3 & ch. 5; John McMillan, Dango: Japan's PriceFixing Conspiracies, 3 ECON. & POL 201 (1991).
109. See Milgrom et al., supra note 17.
110. See Hsing, supra note 62.
111. See Bernstein, supra note 81.
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val guilds,112 the Japanese bank clearinghouse, the Fur Dressers' and
Fur Dyers' Association, and other US trade associations discussed in
Section III.B above, and the Mexican shoe-industry association pro
vide examples of this.
In one sense, a one-sided association has an incentive to promote
contracting efficiency because it furthers the interest of even a one
sided association for its members to be able to credibly make prom
ises. Firms can generally structure contracts so that either side re
ceives most of the gain from defecting. In Mexican footwear, for ex
ample, retailers could pay at the time orders are placed. This would
put the burden of cooperation on the manufacturer rather than the re
tailer. Since the manufacturers are organized, and a retailer's reputa
tion spreads more quickly, having the retailer move last (that is, pay
after delivery) makes cooperation easier to sustain.

That industry associations may go beyond contract enforcement to
coalitional bargaining helps answer a puzzle: Why might wholesalers
replace trade associations in ensuring cooperation? At first glance,
wholesalers are at a disadvantage. They have no direct sanctions.
Moreover, because they represent only a portion of the buyers and
sellers, they are less effective in transmitting information than an asso
ciation comprised solely of one side of the transaction. But competi
tion among wholesalers gives them an incentive to be fair and honest.
Those with reputations for fairly arbitrating disputes between buyers
and sellers will see their business grow and their profits increase.
Competition gives the middlemen stronger incentives than a monopo
listic trade association to monitor the suppliers and clients they deal
with (their "members") and to be honest in arbitrating disputes be
tween suppliers and clients.
The downside of private order goes farther than discrimination or
mere economic inefficiencies. A corollary of private order in some
cases is socially destructive activities. Private-order organizations usu
ally limit their sanctioning techniques to boycotting offenders, but
sometimes effective contract enforcement needs stronger sanctions.

In situations involving a large initial investment with a long-delayed
return, for example, the shadow of the future may not be strong
enough to deter reneging. In the absence of a functioning legal sys
tem, then, private-order organizations might be tempted to expand
their enforcement techniques. Some private-order organizations use
threats of physical violence. The Sicilian and Russian Mafias, for ex
ample, offer contract-supporting services, but a lot else besides.113 Or-

112. See Avner Greif et al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of
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Eugene Kandel, Contract Enforcement Institutions: Historical Perspective and Current Status
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ganized crime, according to Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West, "is the
dark side of private ordering - an entrepreneurial response to ineffi
ciencies in the property rights and enforcement framework supplied
by the state."114 We thus need public order to limit these abuses of
private order.
VI. SUMMARY
People's concern for their own reputation can support contracting
between a pair of trading partners when one or both are locked in, and
among multiple trading partners in close-knit communities where in
formation flows freely. In countries making a transition from planned
to market economies, such spontaneous private ordering substitutes
for the lack of functioning legal systems. The underdevelopment of
the private sector makes cooperation easier to sustain by locking
trading partners together. The market frictions fall as the private sec
tor develops, creating the need for more formal contract enforcement.
In communities where people can hide behind their anonymity,
private order, if it is to operate at all, must be organized. Private
order organizations in notably diverse settings, from medieval Europe
to present-day Mexico, work in similar ways. An organization such as
a market intermediary or a trade association disseminates information
about contractual breaches and coordinates the community's response
to breaches. The usual sanction is to boycott the offender.
The data from our survey of firms in five transition economies in
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union show that social net
works and informal gossip substitute for the formal legal system, while
business networks and trade associations work in conjunction with the
formal legal system.
While private order fosters economic efficiency by making gains
from trade realizable, it sometimes also harms efficiency by excluding
new entrants from trading or by achieving price collusion. Private or
der can cause racial or gender discrimination. Some private-order or
ganizations' enforcement techniques overflow into criminal violence.
Private order can usefully supplement public law, but cannot replace
it.
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